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Abstract 
Social Engineering (ES) is now considered the great security threat to people and organizations. Ever 
since the existence of human beings, fraudulent and deceptive people have used social engineering 
tricks and tactics to trick victims into obeying them. There are a number of social engineering 
techniques that are used in information technology to compromise security defences and attack people 
or organizations such as phishing, identity theft, spamming, impersonation, and spaying. Recently, 
researchers have suggested that social networking sites (SNSs) are the most common source and best 
breeding grounds for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people and launching a variety of social 
engineering based attacks. However, the literature shows a lack of information about what types of 
social engineering threats exist on SNSs. This study is part of a project that attempts to predict a 
persons’ vulnerability to SE based on demographic factors. In this paper, we demonstrate the different 
types of social engineering based attacks that exist on SNSs, the purposes of these attacks, reasons 
why people fell (or did not fall) for these attacks, based on users’ opinions. A qualitative 
questionnaire-based survey was conducted to collect and analyse people’s experiences with social 
engineering tricks, deceptions, or attacks on SNSs.  
Keywords: Social engineering, social networking sites, deception; privacy, trust, information security 
management.  
 1 INTRODUCTION 
Social networking sites (SNSs) are great places for people to communicate with each other and share 
knowledge. Many companies have adapted SNSs to promote collaboration among employees, 
communicate with customers, and advertise products and services. However, SNSs are also ideal 
places for social engineering based attacks and threats. As the number of SNSs users has been 
increasing dramatically, the amount of sensitive and private information of people, companies, 
organizations, or governmental institutions and their activities is also increasing dramatically. This not 
only makes SNSs attractive to faithful users but also makes them perfect breeding grounds for 
malicious users and attackers. Information is always under threat, and it can be intercepted, modified, 
or exposed. The facilities that are setup to monitor such attacks are also constantly under attack 
(Zhang et al. 2010). Such attacks shape the challenges of providing usability and sociability, which are 
the main purposes of SNSs, as well as ensuring integrity, confidentiality, and availability, which are 
standard principles of security. 
Deceiving or influencing people to provide critical information or to perform an action that will 
benefit the attacker is known as “social engineering” (Mitnick et al. 2001). Fraudulent and deceptive 
people have been using social engineering traps and tactics using social networking sites to trick 
victims into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes and attacks such as 
phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many other 
forms of attack. Several studies have investigated and highlighted the risks associated with social 
engineering in SNSs, e.g., (Dimensional-Research 2011); (Hogben 2007); (Nagy et al. 2009); (Jagatic 
et al. 2007); (Algarni  et al. 2013); and (Chitrey et al. 2012). Those studies suggest that SNSs are 
among the most common source of social engineering threats. Although these studies and many others 
show the risk associated with social engineering in SNSs, more research needs to be done to address 
such threat. This study is part of a project that attempts to predict a person’s vulnerability to SE based 
on demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, and educational level), relationship status, and personality 
type. It is a part of a project that uses a sequential exploratory mixed method, starting with a 
qualitative phase followed by a quantitative phase. In this present study, a qualitative questionnaire-
based survey was used to anonymously investigate peoples’ real experience in terms of social 
engineering based attacks in SNSs, and therefore to encourage participants to report their real 
experience without hesitation so that we gain as much knowledge as possible about the phenomenon. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK 
The strong relationship between deception and social engineering illustrates the complexity of 
detecting and controlling social engineering based attacks (Algarni et al. 2013b). On the organizational 
level, the findings of a study done by Kvedar (2010), suggest that social engineers could succeed even 
among those organizations that identify themselves as being aware of social engineering techniques 
(Kvedar et al. 2010). Marett et al. (2004) have explained that the reason why people are weak and 
perform poorly in detecting deception is because of the “lie detector bias,” which is the assumption 
that most people are telling the truth (Marett et al. 2004). Most of the books and studies that have been 
published regarding social engineering indicate that the main causes of human weaknesses that lead 
people to fall victim to social engineers are human sociopsychological characteristics (Bezuidenhout et 
al. 2010; Mohebzada et al. 2010; Pattinson et al. 2012; Twitchell 2006). Human sociopsychology has 
been discussed in relation to social engineering to understand why humans are the weakest link in 
information security (Bezuidenhout et al. 2010; Gragg 2003; Mitnick et al. 2001; Nohlberg 2008; 
Peltier 2006). However, the discussions in these studies are mainly focused on persuasion and 
influence in marketing, especially the principles of influence outlined by Cialdini (Cialdini 2001). 
Cialdini suggests that liking, reciprocity, scarcity, social proof, fear, and strong affect are the main 
tools of persuading customers in order to buy certain products or services. Although the extant 
literature considers the principles of persuasion and influence on the basis of marketing as human 
vulnerabilities, that literature revealed no theoretical framework specifically grounding the study of 
the factors affect social engineering threats in information security.  
 The common techniques of social engineering that are suggested in the current literature include the 
following: “Phishing,” which is enticing a victim to download an attachment or to click on an 
embedded hyperlink or tricking the victim to reveal critical information such as username and 
password (Coronges et al. 2012); “persuasion and bribery,” which is attempting to persuade an 
employee to do an action even if this action bypasses company rules (Richardson 2007); “shoulder 
surfing,” which involves looking over an unsuspecting user’s shoulder while he/she is entering his/her 
user name and password or while he/she is doing his/her work; “spam,” which involves sending 
messages to various people to ask for certain personal information, to get them to buy or sell products 
and services, or to ask them to participate or donate for charitable works (Mohebzada et al. 2010); 
“dumpster diving,” which is looking for valuable information in a company dumpster to find a phone 
directory, for example (Richardson 2007); “reverse attack,” in which the attacker does not establish 
contact with the victim, but rather, the social engineer tricks victims into contacting him/her. In the 
reverse attack case, the victim will be extremely trusting of the attacker, and the attacker will take the 
chance to ask the victim to give up any information or to do any action (Irani et al. 2011). While some 
of those techniques are presented in the literature based on real life situation or using email messages, 
the same techniques can be done in SNSs easily by spying on the users’ activities and posts, or by 
diving into users’ profiles, groups, events, and pages to look for any valuable information that can help 
attackers to trick users directly or indirectly (Algarni et al. 2013a).  
The commonly suggested countermeasures for defending against social engineering based attacks 
include the following: “Education and training” which involves developing security awareness and 
training programs to train employees in ways to resist social engineering (Brody 2012). “Policy and 
management” which involves developing clear and concise security protocols that are enforced 
consistently throughout the organization, as well as developing simple rules defining what information 
is sensitive (Gragg 2003; Kvedar et al. 2010); “Auditing and testing” which involves testing 
employees’ susceptibility to social engineering based attacks (Mitnick et al. 2001). The literature 
shows that there is a severe lack of research dedicated to the susceptibility of social engineering 
victimization in SNSs, or to understanding which demographic factors correlate with falling for social 
engineering tricks in SNSs. However, there are a few studies that have the measured susceptibility to 
specific types of phishing email attacks (which is a type of social engineering based attacks) or studied 
the effectiveness of one or more phishing countermeasures in relation to some demographic factors, 
e.g., (Jagatic et al. 2007), (Kvedar et al. 2010), (Pattinson et al. 2012), (Workman 2008), (Kumaraguru 
et al. 2009), (Parrish Jr et al. 2009), (Sheng et al. 2010), and (Darwish et al. 2012). The difference 
between our study and those studies is that our focus is social engineering in SNSs and not on using e-
mail. Moreover, we are interested in investigating the factors that influence users to fall victims for 
social engineering in SNSs and if there is a relationship between the affectedness of each factor and 
user demographics or personality type. 
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Objective 
The qualitative questionnaire-based survey is a technique whereby the researcher gains a deep 
understanding of the human behaviors as well as the different reasons that govern their behaviors 
(Denzin et al. 2005). A qualitative method is one that engages in the investigations with regard to the 
how and the why of the decision making rather than just focusing on when, where, and what questions. 
Thus, a small sample-size can be sufficient if saturation is reached, and statistical confidence is not 
needed to be computed (Creswell et al. 2007). Saturation is the point when the researcher is no longer 
seeing of finding new factors, which occurs in this study in the first forty participations. Because of 
the sensitivity surrounding the subject, and to encourage more participants, we made the survey 
concise and the participation anonymous. Moreover, to avoid fabricated stories or bias, we made the 
participation totally voluntary. A pilot study was conducted, first to test the reliability of the 
questionnaire and to examine which questions needed revision. Definitions, explanations, and 
examples were given at the beginning of the survey to illustrate what we mean by social engineering 
 based attacks, social networking sites, and the purpose of the study. Demographic variables were also 
provided as a drop-down list to choose from, and the following specific questions were asked: 
1) Have you experienced, faced, or run across any social engineering based attack in SNSs, such as 
deception, abuse, damage, loss, fraud, or any other type of social engineering based attacks? 
2) What type of social engineering based attacks have you run across? Please tell us your experience. 
3) In which social networking sites did this happened? 
4) How did you respond to it? 
5) Why did you respond to it in this way?  
3.2 Sampling and Approaching 
A letter of invitation for participation was sent to various organizations asking the directors if they 
would be willing to disseminate it to their personnel. Two organizations accepted the request and 
disseminate the invitation to their personal. More than four thousand people have been approached, a 
total of 78 responses were collected, and their participation was voluntary. The sample that was 
approached includes both genders (male and female), a variety of ages (from 18 to 60 years), and a 
variety of education levels (secondary school, bachelors, masters, and PhD). Moreover, the 
respondents are random people, represent diversity in demographics as we will describe in the findings 
section, and have at least one account in SNSs. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
A total of 78 responses were collected. However, after critical screening, six responses were not 
relevant to social engineering based attacks and were therefore discarded. Thematic analysis—a 
technique whereby the researcher identifies themes or patterns in the data thought to reflect the 
participants’ experiences—was then used to analyze the data (Braun et al. 2006). The researcher 
begins with “open coding” to find core categories. In this study, the core categories are the main 
dimensions of the factors influencing the users’ judgment of source credibility. After identifying the 
major factors, the researcher starts “axial coding,” which seeks to find categories under each core 
category. Axial coding involves finding causal conditions (which determine what factor causes what 
effect), strategies (which are actions taken in response to the core problem), and consequences (which 
are the effects of using the strategies) (Corbin et al. 1990; Strauss et al. 1998). Finally, the researcher 
performs “selective coding,” which seeks to develop link and relationship that are interrelated with the 
categories. 
4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Purposes of Social Engineering Based Attacks in SNSs 
Although SNSs are basically web-based applications, and the current literature review has focused on 
finance-based purposes and attacks, the questionnaire results show that attackers and deceivers use 
social engineering tricks and techniques for a variety of reasons and purposes. As represented in 
Figure 1, approximately 21 percent of the participants stated that they have run across an actual or 
attempted sexual-purpose attack (any involuntary sexual act in which a person is threatened, or 
manipulated to engage against their will); 44 percent have run across an actual or attempted of 
financial-purpose attack (forcing, manipulating, or tricking the user to make action that will benefit the 
attacker financially) ; 6 percent have run across an actual or attempted reputation-destruction-purpose 
attack (reputation destruction of  product, person, or company); 1 percent have run across an actual or 
attempted sport-fanaticism-purpose attack; 6 percent have run across an actual or attempted political-
purpose attack; 3 percent have run across an actual or attempted religion-or-belief-purpose attack 
(Approving a specific belief or attacking another belief); 4 percent have run across an actual or 
attempted increasing the number of friends-purpose (prestige-purpose) attack; 4 percent have run 
across an actual or attempted pleasure-purpose attack and 11 percent have run across an actual or 
attempted unclear or unknown-purpose attack. 
  
Figure 1. Percentages of Purposes of SE Based Attacks in SNSs 
4.2 Techniques and Types of Social Engineering Based Attacks 
To reiterate, while a review of the current literature suggests the following common techniques and 
types of social engineering based attacks: e-mail phishing, persuasion and bribery, shoulder surfing, e-
mail spam, dumpster diving, and reverse attack, the questionnaire results of our study show how some 
of these techniques can be performed in SNSs, and show also some additional techniques and types of 
social engineering that are being used in SNSs. These types or techniques are: 
 Identity theft, such as making profiles using the identities of others. 
 Fake credentials, such as making fake pages of companies or organizations and supporting those 
fake pages with fake logos and information.  
 Impersonation, such as playing the role of a sexy girl, a poor person, a company page, a famous 
actor, a doctor, or a businessperson. 
 Copyright violation, such as stealing photos or posts. 
 Content-based phishing, such as posts or news that offer jobs or services and ask for critical 
information in order to win or obtain that offer. 
 Application-based phishing, such as games that acquires access to private information or other 
types of harmful applications. 
 Interpersonal deception, such as friendship that ends with emotional, sexual, or financial abuse. 
 Dishonest and malicious contents, such as fake stories, videos, photos, or other types of posts that 
aim to destroy or increase the reputation of a person, product, or party. 
These new findings have emerged perhaps because this paper is among the first few papers to 
investigate social engineering in SNSs, which have specific and different characteristics than using e-
mails, telephone, or face-to-face social engineering. Figure 2 shows the questionnaire results regarding 
the techniques and types of social engineering based attacks. It is important to mention here that some 
reported incidents include more than one type of technique. 
 
Figure 2. Percentages of Techniques and Types of SE Based Attacks 
4.3 Types of Responses to These Attacks 
The questionnaire results point out a very important issue in regard to social engineering based attacks 
in SNSs. That is, in e-mail-, telephone-, or face-to-face-based social engineering, the reaction of the 
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 targeted victim is usually either falling for the attack or rejecting it. However, the questionnaire results 
show that the users of SNSs can participate in distributing tricks and attacks even if they did not fall to 
these attacks. Some of the participants of this survey admitted that they have participated in 
distributing tricks or attacks using some features of SNSs such as “liking,” “retweeting,” or “sharing.” 
As shown in figure 3, there are three types of responses reported by the participants in this study who 
had run across any type of social engineering trick or attack: 
Type 1: Discovering the deception or the trick and rejecting it. 
Type 2: Accepting, or falling for a social engineering trick or attack. 
Type 3: Accepting, or falling for a social engineering trick and participating in distributing it. 
 
Figure 3. Percentages of the Types of Responses to SE Attacks 
4.4 The SNSs through which Participants Encountered Tricks 
Figure 4 shows the different SNSs that participants identified as the places that their reported stories of 
social engineering based attacks took place. However, it is important to mention here that some 
participants did not indicate the specific SNS or they indicated more than one SNS. 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of SNSs through which Participants Encountered SE 
4.5 Common Reasons Why Participants Fell for Social Engineering Tricks 
The current literature review suggests that the main causes or reasons people fall for social 
engineering based attacks are the human sociopsychological factors. Our questionnaire results analysis 
also agreed that human sociopsychological factors are the main reasons people fall vatic to such 
attacks. However, we think that our questionnaire results show a better picture of how these 
sociopsychological factors influence people to fall for social engineering tricks, because the 
participants were asked “Why did you respond to the attack or the attempt of attack in this way?” They 
answered, as shown in figure 5, by one or more of the following answers: 
 Wanting to help, such as helping an attacker who played the role of poor person or representative 
of a charitable organization asking for donations. 
 Falling in love or into an emotional or sexual relationship, such as obeying or revealing personal 
information to an attacker who acted the part of a sexy girl or handsome guy. 
 Feeling too shy to say no. 
 Wanting to try, see, or accept something offered by an attacker, such as downloading “harmful” 
applications, videos, or photos.   
 Developing trust through a long-term relationship with an attacker, which the attacker then exploits 
to attack the victim. 
 Feeling safe from or unaware of threat because of phony webpages, logos, and contents that deliver 
a trick or harmful offer. 
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Figure 5. Percentages of Common Reasons Why Participants Fell for SE Tricks 
4.6 Common Causes for Participation in Distributing Social Engineering Tricks 
Our questionnaire results show that human sociopsychological factors can be also the main reasons 
why people participate in distributing social engineering tricks. However, although our questionnaire 
results show some common sociopsychological factors in both falling for tricks and participating in 
distributing them, among other users, the results also show different sociopsychological reasons 
behind why people participate in distributing social engineering tricks in SNSs, even if they did not 
fall victim to them (As shown in figure 6):  
 Wanting to help, such as helping friends or users who might be in need of something offered by an 
attacker by “sharing”, “liking”, or “retweeting” the attacker’s offer. This offer may be a job, prize, 
or deal that requires victims to provide personal information. 
 Approving a specific belief in a post with an embedded attack that activates emotional religious, 
political, or other feelings, leading users to “share”, “like", or “retweet” the malicious content.  
 Wanting to impress or amaze others by “sharing”, “liking”, or “retweeting” an amazing story or 
post with an embedded attack or trick.  
 Seeking prestige or acceptance by “sharing”, “liking”, or “retweeting” something offered by an 
attacker that requires victims to provide information or perform a harmful act to obtain the offer. 
 
Figure 6. Percentages of Common Causes for Participation in Distributing SE Tricks 
4.7 Common Reasons Why People Do Not Fall for Social Engineering Tricks 
The current literature review suggests some commons countermeasures of social engineering such as 
training and education, policy and management, and auditing and testing. Our questionnaire results 
analysis also agreed that those countermeasures play vital roles in preventing people from falling for 
social engineering tricks and attacks. However, our questionnaire results show more countermeasures 
and factors that might help people in controlling their behaviors in SNSs. That is, some of the 
participants indicated some others reasons that made them aware of various deception tactics that 
occur in SNSs. For example, some participants stated that the way their family and parents have raised 
them made them aware of many tricks and helped them to control their behaviors when they deal with 
strangers. Moreover, some other participants stated that culture and social restrictions prevent them 
from going further in some behaviors such as seeking or making sexual-based relationships with 
others in SNSs. Finally, some participant shared that the fear of punishment by God, employer, 
spouse, or government helped them control their behaviors when they deal with strangers or when 
someone persuades them to make illegal action.  Figure 7 shows what the questionnaire results which 
indicate the reasons why participants do not fall for social engineering tricks or behave in ways that 
would make them more susceptible to social engineering based attacks.  
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Figure 7. Percentages of Common Reasons Why People Do Not Fall for SS Tricks 
5 DISCUSSION, LIMITATION, AND FUTURE WORK 
It has been shown that SNSs can be dangerous weapons in hand of social engineers who use fake 
profiles, accounts, pages, and identities to entrap victims. This reflects the susceptibility of people and 
organizations falling victims to attackers who impersonate third parties and the susceptibility of people 
and organizations to identity theft by an attacker. Based in the result of this study, we suggest that 
impersonation is the key element of social engineering threats in SNSs. Because impersonation plays 
an important role in most of the social engineering threats such as phishing, identity theft, spamming, 
spaying, and reverse attacks, and because SNSs also lack effective techniques for predicting, 
detecting, or controlling such threats, researchers must find effective methods that help to eliminating 
them. As mentioned before, this study is part of a project that uses a sequential exploratory mixed 
method to predict a person’s vulnerability to SE victimization based on his/her demographic variables 
such as age, gender, educational level, relationship status, and personality type. As shown in figure 8, 
for the qualitative phase, a triangulation approach, which involves the qualitative questionnaire-based 
survey (the present study), observations, and interviews will be used to explore the all possible factors 
that affect social engineering based attack in SNSs. For the second phase, the quantitative phase, we 
will use an experimental study to test our findings and to examine to what extent these factors can 
affect user victimization, and to link there factors to users’ demographic variables. 
 
Figure 8.  Full Project Design 
The present study explored some parts of the phenomenon using questionnaire-based survey. While 
this work provides significant findings, there are two limitations worth noting. First, in order to 
encourage more participants to respond without feeling vulnerable or hesitant, we made our study with 
a very concise questionnaire-based survey with limited and focused questions. Therefore, it lacks the 
in-depth interactivity with the participants and richness of information that would give a fuller picture 
of potential hidden factors. However, this limitation should be eliminated by using the observations 
and interviews that will be conducted during the triangulation approach. The second limitation is that 
the present study did not investigate the existence of a relationship between the findings and users’ 
demographics due to the small number of participants in this phase and because the aim of this study is 
exploratory only. However, this limitation should be eliminated by using the quantitative method in 
the second phase. Using a mixed methods design will ensure the validity and reliability of the study by 
illuminating the biases and subjectivity of the interpretation; such biases can occur in a qualitative 
study where the researcher has to interpret the data to explore the most important source 
characteristics. 
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